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The Impact of the Courts on Public Administration
JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON*
"The Impact of the Courts. . . ." What a disruptive-sounding word,
impact. It's obvious an administrator thought of that title. A judge would
never speak of the "impact" of the courts. Terms like "the long and
fruitful collaboration"' of courts and public administrators, or the "part-
nership ' 2 between courts and public administrators are preferred. Some
skeptics in the community might have still another perspective, like: "The
Conspiracy of the Courts and Public Administrators." A person's views
seem to depend on his vantage point.
Forty years ago, if anyone had asked what the impact of the judicial
system was on public administration, many lawyers probably would have
been a little puzzled, but soon would have responded that at least they were
not aware of any real impact. Until ten or fifteen years ago, about the only
public administrators regularly troubled with court review were regulatory
agencies functioning in a structured system of advocacy considering
primarily economic matters such as rate making. Nonetheless, the absence
of court involvement in the day-to-day activities of public administrators
for years does not necessarily indicate that agency processes ran so well that
no review or restraints were necessary. The absence of a phenomenon
does not tell you why that phenomenon is absent.
Even where courts have intervened in the administrative process over
the last forty years, the impact was not universally viewed as constructive or
positive. Those who were subject to the delays and burdens of court review
would have been quite pleased to have eliminated the requirements of
hearings, written opinions, evidence in the record and procedural due
process - not to mention the second-guessing on the merits that sometimes
occurred. However, until recently, many areas, such as prisons, were
regarded by the courts as involving "mere housekeeping" matters and
remained largely untouched by judicial review.3
*Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. An
earlier version of this article was delivered as an address to the 1976 National Conference of the
American Society for Public Administration.
I wish to express my gratitude for the assistance of my law clerk, Donald Elliott, in the
preparation of this article.
'Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(Bazelon, C.J.).2Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Leventhal,
J.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
3See, e.g., Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970, 971 (8th Cir. 1965) (censorship and limitation on
prisoners' correspondence held "inherent incidents in the conduct of penal institutions;"
complaint dismissed); Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487, 490 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 932 (1964) (complaint by Muslim prisoners unable to abide by religion's dietary laws
dismissed as non-justiciable; " . . . crurts will not interfere with matters of routine prison
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Even in criminal law - clearly a field of law that contemplates an
active role for the judiciary - only a small part of the administrative
process ever saw the light of a courtroom. Eighty-five percent of all federal
defendants are still sentenced after plea bargaining without "judicial"
determination of their allegedly criminal activities.4 Scholars in the 1960's
rediscovered this wide discretion of the police, prosecution and prison
officials, which had always affected the freedom of individuals. 5
In the past fifteen years, significant changes have been made in the
criminal justice system. The courts have looked beyond the first court
appearance in requiring the observance of procedural safeguards. 6 The
courts have also moved beyond the sentencing stage to look at post-
conviction incarceration, whether in prison or mental institutions.7 For
example, a court in Alabama has now defined the psychiatrist-patient ratio
which a state mental institution is required to maintain in order to be
consistent with a Constitutional right to treatment.8 In the District of
Columbia a court reviewed a decision whether to release a convicted child
molester who, although not completely recovered, was no longer deemed
dangerous. 9 Moreover, the Supreme Court has determined the circum-
stances under which state prison officials may censor inmates' mail 0 and
administration ... [and] [nlothing could be more routine than determining dining hours and
pratices."); Konigsberg v. Ciccone, 285 F. Supp. 585, 597-600 (W.D. Mo. 1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d
161 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 963 (1970) (prisoner's complaints regarding thefts of
personal property, insect-contaminated food, insufficient daily ration of water "do not rise to
a sufficient status of ill treatment to authorize judicial interference.").
41n fiscal 1975, a total of 37, 443 defendants were convicted and sentenced in the United
States District Courts. Of them, 31, 816 (85%) pled guilty or nolo contendere. ADMINIsTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1975 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR A-58 (Table D
7).
5See, e.g., K. DAvis, DIscRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969); Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to
Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69
YALE L.J. 543 (1960).
6 One of the primary procedural safeguards imposed by the courts is the requirement that
an arrested person be given a prompt hearing before a magistrate to determine if probable
cause exists to detain him. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Mallory v.
United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (fourteenth
amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended
restraint of liberty following arrest). See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).7Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Bazelon, C.J.) (right to treatment for
persons involuntarily committed to a mental hospital). Cf. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
563 (1975) (state may not constitutionally confine nondangerous persons capable of caring for
themselves); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam) (right to practice Buddist faith in
prison); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (prison legal assistance).8Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 383 (M.D. Ala. 1972), supplementing, 325 F. Supp.
781, aff'd in part, remanded in part, and reserved on this point, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
The district court said that some standards for mental health care were needed. The court then
set standards. On appeal, the parties stipulated that the standards set by the district court were
the minimum required, if standards were required at all. Therefore, the appellate court never
reached the issue of the court's standards.9United States v. McNeil, 434 F.2d 502, 503 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
'
0 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
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the procedural guarantees which must accompany in-prison disciplinary
proceedings."
Had it stopped with the criminal justice system and related institu-
tions, however, the reach of the courts still would have affected only a small
percentage of administrators. Instead, the even more recent due process
"explosion" has brought petitions for judicial review of allegedly illegal
actions from schools, hospitals - indeed from all parts of the administra-
tive process. The growth of public advocacy - by individuals, the legal
services program and public interest law firms - has fueled this expansion
of court activities, which is sometimes referred to as the "due process
revolution."
Remember, judges do not have the power to intervene on their own in
governmental affairs. A federal judge can't wake up one morning and
simply decide to give a helpful little push to a school system, a mental
hospital, or the local housing agency. 12 Courts become involved in the
administrative process only when a party cares enough about the injustice
he perceives has been done to him to expend the time and energy - as well
as money - to petition for redress. If public administrators had no
dissatisfied clients, judges would only get to see them at cocktail parties
and conventions. The courts and the adversary process do not create
adversity (in the sense of "conflict" or "opposition"); they merely provide
the forum and the technique whereby already-existing conflicts are brought
out into the open in an effort to reconcile and resolve them.
To understand the proper role for the courts and administrators in this
process, it is necessary to define what courts can and cannot do, as well as
to understand the impetus behind expanding judicial review. A fundamen-
tal limitation on the role of the courts - some believe honored more often
in the breach than in the observance - is that courts may not substitute
their own views for those of the administrators. While rate cases look
simple compared to some of today's esoteric scientific issues, rate disputes
were originally seen as complicated matters requiring the application of
regulatory agency expertise.' 3 The court's role was to assure simply that
the agency functioned fairly and treated all interests with decency.
Agencies were to proceed in a manner designed to ensure that the parties,
the public, and the reviewing courts knew the basis of their decision and so
that the courts could review their reasoning in light of the evidence.
Therefore, the agency had to accord a hearing to all interested parties, to
marshal a record, and to produce a written rationale for the decision.
Although these rules may seem fair, some people accuse courts of
"Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). See also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 452 U.S. 308
(1976).
12See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2: "The judicial Power shall extend to . . . Cases [and]
Controversies .. " See generally United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 180, 188-97 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring).
'
5 See FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602, 615-18 (1944).
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manipulating these doctrines to set aside administrative decisions with
which they do not agree.1 4 Admittedly, this may occur, but the incidence is
a good deal less frequent than many critics suppose. When a judge's
experience gives him a particular familiarity with an area, he - like any
other human being - may develop views of proper policy. When a court
thinks the administrative process has resulted in a clearly "right" decision,
the temptation is great not to waste time sending the case back to correct a
minor procedural error. On the other hand, when the court does not feel
comfortable trusting its own expertise with the subject matter, it is much
more likely to insist on strict observance of procedural safeguards to fulfill
its role of insuring proper administrative procedures.
Where courts prescribe remedies, they confront another set of limita-
tions. Courts cannot appropriate money. Courts can order desegregation,
but they cannot always make it happen. Courts can order a juvenile
detention facility closed, but they cannot build a new one. For example, a
federal court recently found that conditions in a New York City jail, aptly
called the "Tombs", "manifestly violate the Constitution and would shock
the conscience of any citizen who knew of them."' 5 The judge ordered the
city to submit a plan to correct the situation. When the city refused, citing
its fiscal crisis, the judge ordered the hundred-year-old jail shut down,
causing all of the prisoners to be transferred to another jail. The inmates
of the second jail petitioned the court alleging that now their rights were
being violated by the overcrowding at their jail. 16 As President Andrew
Jackson so eloquently put it long ago: "John Marshall has made his
decision. Now let him enforce it."'"
Administrators are not always happy about judges meddling in their
affairs; judges are not always happy with the administrative responses to
14A sophisticated version of this skepticism about whether courts mean what they say
when they reverse agencies on procedural points is found in Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1701-02 (1975). Professor Stewart
responds to critics (such as Joseph Sax) who take the position that "the emphasis of the
redemptive quality of procedural reform is about nine parts myth" by stating that that
position goes too far. Id. In Stewart's view, procedural rules can be useful even though they do
not affect outcomes in the first instance, since they provide the court with a device for forcing
agency reconsideration of decisions with which the court does not agree on the merits:
A requirement that agencies articulate and consistently pursue policy choices may
have only a modest effect on outcomes, but it can serve as a useful, selective judicial
tool to force agency reconsideration of questionable decisions and to direct attention
to factors that may have been disregarded.
Id. (emphasis added).
My dissenting collegues have sometimes seen, in my own opinions, a substantive message
wrapped in a procedural envelope. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United
States Nuclear Regulatory Comm., No. 74-1385, slip op. at 6 n. 8 (D.C. Cir., July 21, 1976)
(Tamm J., concurring).
'
5Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, 636 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974).
16See Rhem v. Malcolm, 527 F.2d 1041, 1042-43 (2d Cir. 1975).
17S. MORRIsON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 450 (1965).
[Vol. 52:101
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their meddling. Under the circumstances, a certain amount of disappoint-
ment and frustration on both sides is entirely natural. As the Consitutional
right to due process of law expands, more and more administrators will
find themselves locked into involuntary partnerships with the courts.
Therefore, efforts should be made to forge a better relationship between
the partners.
Some new proposals have been suggested by Chief Justice Burger and
others to keep some grievances out of the federal courts.18 The value of
these changes will depend on what kinds of grievances are involved and on
what substitute forums are provided. Internal review procedures for
processing grievances at the administrative level have long been favored by
this author. Administrators may then correct their own mistakes, thereby
minimizing the number of times they must defend, in court, a decision they
really do not support. Moreover, if judicial review is requested for a
grievance which has been fully ventilated in administrative proceedings,
review may then be based solely on the written record of those proceedings
without the need for a burdensome, time-consuming trial. One of the
major objections to judicial review is thereby minimized.
Indeed, civil liberties and consumers groups have charged that in recent
years the Supreme Court has been cutting back on a citizen's right of access
to the federal courts.1 9 There would seem to be something to these charges.
These developments, though, have not as yet dismantled the "due process
revolution." At the same time that the Supreme Court has been cutting
back on the rights of consumers to bring class actions, 20 it has been
expanding the rights of prisoners to challenge the conditions of their
confinement.2' At the same time the Court has been cutting back on the
power of the federal courts to remedy police brutality,22 it has been
expanding their authority over school disciplinary proceedings.23 One
dares not attempt to predict precisely what future directions the Court may
take.
Just as courts and administrators are beginning to dig out from under
18See, e.g., Burger Urges New Ways to Resolve Court Disputes, N.Y. Times, April 8, 1976,
at 27, col. 2.
19See, e.g., Supreme Court Accused of 'Dangerous' Trends in Curbs on Judicial
Protection, N.Y. Times, April 7, 1976, at 11, col. 1. But see High Court Record on Individual
Rights Defended by Burger, N.Y. Times, April 9, 1976, at 1, col. 8.2 0See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2)
requires notice to identifiable class members at plaintiff's expense); Zahn v. International
Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (each plaintiff in a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3)
must independently satisfy the $10,000 requirement for diversity jurisdiction).21See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) (state prisoners may challenge the
conditions of their confinement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without exhausting state remedies;
however, when prisoners seek early release, habeas corpus, which requires exhaustion, is the
exclusive remedy).22See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (requiring a comprehensive remedial plan for
civil rights violations was held to be an impermissable judicial intrusion on the police power).
See also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).2
sSee Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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the upheaval created by the "due process explosion," another explosion
strikes. Three revolutions have occurred during the lifetime of this author
which have fundamentally altered man's view of himself and his world: the
tele-communications revolution; the atomic or energy revolution; and one
which is only now beginning, the biological revolution. In their wake,
society is realizing that many "accidents of fate" - cancer, mental
retardation, even crime. - are products of forces which may be subject to
control. Society has responded by turning to government for protection
from the forces which affect our lives but against which individuals are
defenseless. The federal government now monitors the air we breathe, 2 the
food we eat,2 5 and the water we drink for traces of cancer-causing chemicals
and other harmful substances; 26 it makes judgments on the safety of nuclear
power plants27 and drugs; 28 it even sets on-the-job standards for noise, to
prevent deafness, and for light, to prevent blindness.29 Since these decisions
require scientific and technical expertise, the decisionmaking process has
been delegated to administrators. As a check on administrative arbitrari-
ness, Congress has mandated judicial review. To illustrate the increasing
role of administrative procedures, compare Secretary Coleman's recent
Concorde decision - made after an elaborate series of hearings - with
Henry Ford's decision to mass-produce automobiles - made, for all we
know, in the privacy of his boudoir.
The multitude of new statutes aimed at controlling technology are of
particular concern to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. At present over two-thirds of the D.C. Circuit's docket
involves federal administrative action, far more than any other court in our
country, and all signs point to a continuing increase.3 0 These cases are
increasingly involved with the frontiers of science and technology: What
are the ecological effects of building a pipeline for badly-needed oil across
the Alaskan tundra?3' Does the public health require removal of lead
additives from gasoline?3 2 How can society manage radioactive wastes from
nuclear reactors, wastes which remain toxic for centuries?33 Shall we ban
the Concorde SST 4 or Red Dye #2?s5 These and many, many more such
24See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970).
25See Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1970).
26See Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (Supp. IV 1974).
27See Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970).
28See Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1970).29See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970).
30See Leventhal, Appellate Procedures: Design, Patchwork, and Managed Flexibility, 23
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 432, 437 (1976).
3
'Wilderess Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
917 (1973).32Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2663
(1976).33Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm.,
No. 74-1385 (D.C. Cir. July 21, 1976) (Tamm, J., concurring).34Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Coleman, No. 76-1105 (D.C. Cir. May 19, 1976)
(unreported).35Certified Color Mfrs. Ass'n v. Mathews, No. 76-1120 (D.C. Cir. July 6, 1976).
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imponderables now come before that court, although not all cases involve
such weighty issues. Indeed, one recent case involved the intracacies of
potato chip manufacturing, 6 and another concerned a salve for cows with
sore udders.3 7
Significant or not, decisions involving scientific or technical expertise
present peculiar challenges for reviewing courts. The problem is not so
much that judges will impose their own views on the merits. The question
is whether they will even know what is happening. In one complicated
case, this author wrote that "I recognize that I do not know enough about
dynamometer extrapolations, deterioration factor adjustments, and the like
to decide whether or not the government's approach to these matters was
statistically valid."3 8 At least when a judge goes too far into the merits of
an ICC rate case or an FCC licensing proceeding, he may have a speaking
familiarity with the material and is unlikely to do too much damage.
Where the evidence is scientific or mathematical, most judges are in over
their heads, whether they know it or not.
Recognizing these limitations, however, courts are not about to - nor
should they - retreat entirely. Both in scientific and more traditional
areas, what judges can do - and do well when conscious of their role and
their limitations - is monitor the decisionmaking process. They can
ensure that the decisional process is thorough, complete, and rational, and
that it takes into account all relevant information and testimony. Judges
may not exactly understand half-lives, deterioration factor adjustments and
all the rest; but they can make sure that someone who does know has dealt
with all the facts in a clear public way. In effect, they can guarantee that
administrators "let it all hang out."
The pressures to cover up the real grounds for decisions are sometimes
very potent. However, a democracy must resist those pressures at all costs.
Particularly in scientific areas, where the courts are clearly not competent
to evaluate the merits, the administrative process must provide for a system
of peer review and public oversight to guide and correct governmental
decisions. If this system is to operate, the basis for these decisions must be
clearly disclosed and full opportunities for public participation provided.
Then, other experts - in academia, government, and industry - may
present new data or challenge the logic of the administrators' reasoning.
This process of continued review and oversight does not come to a halt
simply because a decision is reached. Administrative 'decisions should
always be open to reconsideration if significant new information is
discovered. Therefore, the record of all proceedings must set forth precisely
-
6American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, No. 74-1464 (D.C. Cir. May 11, 1976).
37Masti-Kure Products Co. v. Mathews, No. 75-1231 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 18, 1976)
(unteported).
38
nternational Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon,
C.J., concurring).
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what data and conclusions were utilized so that the significance of new
information will be readily apparent.
Effective peer and public oversight requires that administrative de-
cisionmakers disclose not only what is but also what is not known:
precisely where and why the experts disagree as well as concur; and where
the information is sketchy as well as complete. For example, when DDT or
cyclamates are banned on the basis -of preliminary studies and theories
which raise doubts about their safety, the decision must acknowledge that
the administrators are acting before all the information is known. That
awareness encourages a diligent search for better information which might
demonstrate that the risk is less - or more - than originally estimated.
The awareness also gives reason to hope that erroneous decisions will not
be frozen in concrete.
This suggestion should not imply that decisions affecting the life and
health of millions are the province of experts alone. While the experts can
speak with particular authority on the scientific side - science is elitist -
the facts alone are very rarely determinative.3 9 Once society has a pretty
good idea what the risks are, it must still decide whether those risks are
worth taking in light of the anticipated benefits. New scientific and
technological developments bring perils and promises. In a world where
resources are scarce, choices between the alternatives usually come down to
a matter of values. No expert has a greater stake in the risk/benefit
sweepstakes than Mr. John Q. Public, the ultimate "guinea pig." There-
fore, even society's most technical decisions must be ventilated in a public
forum with public input and participation.
This kind of honesty is not comfortable. Ordinary mortals, unlike
judges, are reluctant to confess a deficiency of omniscience, or to admit that
their actions may be unnecessary or mistaken. Those administrators who
have devoted a lifetime, with all the personal and professional commit-
ments that entails, to the work of an institution will understandably find it
39Dr. Philip Handler, President of the National Academy of Sciences, has recently had a
very interesting exchange of views on this subject with Peter Barton Hutt, former General
Counsel to the Food and Drug Administration. At a recent Academy forum entitled The
Citizen and the Expert, Hutt put forward a plan for opening Academy committee meetings to
public attendence and participation. That prompted an extemporaneous rejoinder from
Handler in which he stated that the Academy is inherently an "elitist organization" whose
only "special asset" is the technical expertise of its members. See Handler Defends Academy
Elitism, 191 ScIENcE 543 (1976).
It is not necessary here to take a position in the Hander-Hutt debate concerning the
conflict, if any, between the role of the National Academy of Sciences in providing scientific
advice to the government and public participation - or for that matter, the possible conflict
between that role and the absence of public participation. However, Dr. Handler is correct
when he says that determinations of scientific fact are inherently "elitist" in the sense that they
call for special skills. See generally Handler, A Rebuttal: The Need for a Sufficient Scientific
Base for Governmental Regulation, 43 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 808 (1975), for an explanation of
the important, but limited, role which determinations of scientific fact should play in public
policy decisions.
40Ehtyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2663
(1976).
[Vol. 52:101
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threatening to re-examine the institution's usefulness and their role in it. In
the long run, though, public confidence depends on such painful re-
appraisal.
Recently in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,40 for example, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld an Environmental
Protection Agency decision to remove lead from all gasoline because it
posed a health hazard. The issue for the administrator of the EPA was
whether preliminary health data justified a ban on lead. A few studies
suggested that the coordination and intelligence of children, particularly in
ghettos, might be adversely affected by lead from automobile emissions.41
On the other side, removing lead from gasoline would require an $82
million one-time capital investment, increase the cost of gasoline at the
pumps by approximately one-tenth of one cent per gallon, and increase the
nation's consumption of crude oil by approximately four-tenths of one
percent.4 2 The administrator decided the risk to the children's health was
not worth taking, and the court upheld him. The court ruled that
Congress had delegated to the administrator a "legislative policy judg-
ment" 4 in which Congress intended him to estimate risks and balance
competing interests.
Imagine for a moment that the administrator in the Ethyl Corp. case
had struck the "legislative policy" balance in the other direction. It is very
unlikely that he would have stated publicly: "I have chosen not to act at
this time because I do not believe the possibility that a few ghetto children
may be slightly injured is worth the cost in dollars and cents to a larger
group,' the American driving public." He would probably have tried to
hide behind the scientific evidence in a carefully-worded statement, for
instance: "There is no credible evidence at this time indicating lead
represents a serious hazard to anyone's health."
The motives of this hypothetical administrator would be anything but
venal. He could in good faith rationalize that this cover-up is justified by
the hard political "realities" - for instance, that the public is still too
immature to accept the trade-offs between health and dollars which society
makes all the time. The desire to avoid the short-term flak is under-
standable. In doing so, however, a critical opportunity is missed to inform
and, thereby, raise .the level of public understanding. If complex decisions
are couched in terms designed primarily to "sell" the program, like selling
soap, the public cannot be expected to develop greater sophistication.
Moreover, by giving in to the desire to avoid political criticism,
administrators lift the full burden of responsibility for making value-laden
choices onto their own narrow shoulders. Not only can this lead to
paternalistic decisions dictated by institutional interests and elitist per-
4138 Fed. Reg. 33,733, 33,735 (1973).
4238 Fed. Reg. 33,733, 33,739 (1973).
43Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2663
(1976).
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spectives, but it also opens administrators to charges of high-handedness,
bad faith, and cover-up. When administrators frankly lay the competing
considerations out on the table, they may receive guidance from the public
reaction. In addition, by sharing responsibility and increasing under-
standing, recriminations and antagonisms may be muted.
Most important though, simple moral decency requires that the public
be notified of the choices that are made in its name. As noted earlier, they
are the ultimate "guinea pigs" who will have to live with the consequences
of administrative choices. As Thomas Jefferson wrote:
I know no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the
people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise
their contol with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from
them, but to inform their discretion. .... .4
"Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), reprinted in 7
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 177, 179 (H.A. Washington ed. 1855).
[Vol. 52: 101
